used in electorally useful ways (e.g., to perform casework). The indirect effect arises because potential challengers, knowing that incumbents can derive large direct benefits from the resources at their disposal, will be less inclined to enter the fray-and this will be particularly true of potential challengers with higher opportunity costs, hence higher quality. That incumbents can scare off quality opponents seems to be generally appreci ated in the literature. What has been less clearly recognized is that how much this boosts the incumbency advantage depends on how much candidate quality matters in determin ing the vote. The incumbency advantage may have increased because incumbents had more resources and opportunities to perform constituency services (a direct effect) ; or be cause knowledge of these resources and opportunities scared off high-quality challengers (an indirect effect); or both. But even holding constant these factors, the incumbency advantage may also have increased if a given quality differential between candidates mat tered more to the final outcome. That such a "third" effect might have existed seems plausible from the extensive literature depicting the evolution of U.S. House elections from party-centered to candidate-centered contests. Yet none of the current methodolo gies for measuring the incumbency advantage separates the total incumbency advantage into direct, scare-off, and quality effects, so that one can assess the relative contribution over time of each component.
This paper seeks to fill that gap. Our results show that most of the increase in the in cumbency advantage, at least down to 1980, came through increases in the quality effect. Thus, if one wants to explain the overtime development of the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections, it is crucial to understand why having had previous electoral experience-our operational measure of candidate quality-became more and more impor tant in predicting vote shares. This is a different way of posing the explanatory task than is commonly encountered in the literature and it leads, as we shall show, to dif ferent conclusions regarding the relative importance of growing resources and partisan dealignment in explaining the growth of the incumbency advantage.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review the literatures on what caused the incumbency advantage to increase (section 1) and how best to measure this advantage (section 2). We then suggest improvements in both domains, elaborating a simple path analytic model of the incumbency advantage that isolates the direct and indirect effects in which we are interested (section 3). After discussing our operational model (section 4) , we give our results (section 5), discuss a theoretical point raised by those results (section 6), and conclude (section 7).
2

Causes of the Increase in the Incumbency Advan tage
Shortly after the discovery in the 1970s that the value of incumbency had increased sub stantially beginning in the mid-1960s (Erikson 1972; Mayhew 1974) , a cottage industry arose to explain the upward trend. There are now two main contenders in the literature.
One school of thought emphasizes the resources that incumbency confers: The frank ing privilege may be used to subsidize what are in essence campaign mailings; staff and office allowances may be used to provide various electorally valuable services to con stituents; committee positions may be used to help raise campaign funds; the House bank can be used in various creative ways; and so forth. Many of these resources in creased during the 1960s and 1970s, providing a plausible explanation for the increase of the incumbency advantage (Mayhew 1974) . A variant on this line emphasizes the growth of the federal bureaucracy: more bureaucrats meant more red tape to be cut through by helpful, non-partisan, and competent representatives (disposing of more resources to do the cutting), hence more votes from grateful constituents (Fiorina 1977; 1989) .
The evidence for the resources/opportunities school is largely positive at the state level. Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991) , in a study of thirty-two states, find that the sopho more surge (a downwardly-biased estimator of the incumbency advantage; see Gelman and King 1990 ) increases with allowances for staff and for trips back to the constituency. King (1991a) , in a study of thirteen states, finds that the incumbency advantage is sta tistically related to the size of legislative operating budgets, measured on a per legislator basis. Cox and Morgenstern (1993; N.d.) , in studies of twenty-four and forty states, respectively, find that the incumbency advantage increases with the size of legislative operating budgets, measured on a per constituent basis. Finally, Holbrook and Tid march (1993) , in a study of thirty-nine states, find that margins of victory are higher for party leaders and chairs of standing committees, especially in states where these posts are endowed with special staff resources.
At the federal level, the evidence for an incumbency advantage derived through the provision of constituency services is more mixed but still on balance positive. Fiorina (1989, pp. 85-90) notes that "between the 1950s and the 1970s personal staffs of members expanded and their constituency presence surged" and that this has led to "(l) a higher incidence of constituent and district services reported, (2) an increased tendency to eval uate representatives in terms of constituency attentiveness, and (3) a greater impact of constituency service evaluations on House voting." At the same time, Fiorina (p. 94) concedes that "scholars have failed to find a clear, direct link between constituency ser vice in each district and the corresponding electoral outcome." While some see this as a crucial fl.aw in the evidence, points to the crudity of the district-level variables available for analysis2 and the likely simultaneity bias in micro-level studies: members who perform more casework may do so precisely because they are electorally vulnerable, so that the zero-order correlation between casework and vote is attenuated (see also Rivers and Fiorina 1991 ) .
The second major school of thought concerning the incumbency advantage holds that 20ne study that has a particularly strong research design at the district-level is Cover and Serra (1989) . They provide convincing evidence that constituents helped by caseworkers are more likely both to recognize the incumbent's name and to evaluate him or her favorably. Another recent and positive study is that of Alvarez and Schousen (1993) , who find that larger flows of federal grants into a district improve the sitting member's name recognition, likes/dislikes ratio, and vote, especially among Democrats. Indirect evidence of the importance of resources is provided by Hart and Munger (1989) it increased because of partisan dealignment in the electorate. Voters became less party oriented and more candidate-oriented. They weighed party affiliation less and informa tion about the personal characteristics of candidates -including their incumbency status -more in making their voting decisions. The earliest and most frequently encountered version of this argument suggested a simple substitution of an incumbency cue for a party cue: "Voters dissatisfied with party cues could [have reached for] other cues that [were] available in deciding how to vote. The incumbency cue [was] readily at hand" (Mayhew 1974, p. 313) .
In principle, dealignment might have come about either through a distributional change in partisan affiliation within the electorate -e.g., through a decline in the pro portion of strong identifiers and an increase in the proportion of weak and independent leaning identifiers; or through a behavioral change, with voters in all categories of parti san identification putting less weight on the partisan affiliation of candidates, and more weight on their personal characteristics (Ferejohn 1977; Cover 1977; Krehbiel and Wright 1983) . The latter idea, if one takes it seriously, suggests that voters have additively sep arable utility functions of the following form:
Here, the total utility from a candidate with characteristics c and party affiliation p is expressed as a weighted average of an evaluation u( c) of the candidate's personal characteristics and an evaluation v(p) of the candidate's party, with a being the weight on personal characteristics (0 < a< 1). If voters put more weight on candidates' personal character istics, this would lead to an increased incumbency advantage on the assumptions that (1) incumbents either had always had superior personal characteristics, or developed such an advantage (via an increase in resources) in the 1960s; and (2) the average incumbent's "personal quality advantage" exceeded his or her "party differential advantage".
It is not possible directly to observe the weights that voters place on partisan affiliation and personal characteristics. One can, however, observe the behavior of various categories of self-identified partisans. Using this approach, Cover (1977) and Krehbiel and Wright (1983) both find that changes in the distribution of voters across categories of partisan identification account for little of the change in reported vote. They conclude that there has been a more-or-less across-the-board change in a pro-incumbent direction. This change in behavior may reflect an across-the-board decrease in the weight placed on partisan affiliation; but it is also consistent with the various resource hypotheses: greater resources may have given incumbents greater advantages on the personal quality side of the ledger, without necessarily increasing the weight that voters put on that side.
3
Measuring the Incumbency Advantage
In this section, we consider the estimator proposed by Gelman and King ( 1990) . They seek an estimate of the total effect of incumbency, including any scare-off and quality effects, by running the following regression for a given election t:
(1)
Here, vj,t is the Democratic share of the two-party vote at election t; vj,t-l is the Demo cratic share of the two-party vote at election t -l;PJ,t equals 1 if the Democrats are the incumbent party (i.e., a Democratic candidate won at election t -1) and -1 if the Republicans are the incumbent party; Ij,t equals 1 if there is a Democratic incumbent, 0 if there are no incumbents, and -1 if there is a Republican incumbent seeking reelection in district j at election t (this definition ignores the possibility of two or more incumbents in a given district since redistricting years are excluded from the analysis); and u 1 J,t is an error term.
The regression in equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. Suppose PJ,t equals 1 (i.e., the Democrats are the incumbent party). The value of the OLS estimate will reflect a cross-sectional comparison between two subsets of the "PJ,t = 1" districts: those in which the winning Democratic candidate at time t-1 seeks reelection at time t (ht = 1), and those in which he or she does not (ht = 0). As the regression controls for Vj,t-I, one can think of the comparison as being between districts that are similar in terms of their normal vote,3 differing only in whether or not the incumbent sought reelection. The value of will thus reflect any direct benefits of incumbency in the form of resources that can be turned to electoral use. If the presence of an incumbent tends to scare off high-quality challengers, leaving the incumbent an easy contest against a patsy, whereas the absence of an incumbent brings forth strong, well-qualified competitors from both sides, then this too will be reflected in the value of . As noted above, Gelman and King seek to measure the overall impact of incumbency, not just the direct value of the pot of resources to which office-holders have access.
Obviously, the cross-sectional comparison contrived by equation (1) would be mis leading if all the districts with incumbents this time were without incumbents last time, while all the districts without incumbents this time had incumbents last time. For then the lagged vote ( Vj,t-l) would not mean the same thing in the "with incumbent" an<l "without incumbent" districts: a Democrat getting, say, a 52% share of the vote when there is no incumbent says one thing about the normal vote in the district, getting the same share against an incumbent says something else. In particular, on the hypothesis that the incumbency advantage is positive, the normal vote will be higher in the latter than in the former district. In order to take account of possible diversity in the previous incumbency status of districts, Gelman and King note (pp. 1151-52) that one could simply add the lagged incumbency variable, ht-1, to equation (1) Gelman and King find that the correlation between ht and IJ,t-l is in fact modest, when one controls for PJ,ti and accordingly opt for the simpler equation 2, at least when 3The normal vote is defined as the expected vote in a district when short-term forces have a net impact of zero. It is intended to represent the long-term balance of partisan forces in a district. As we shall note below, exactly what one considers to fall in the category of short-term forces affects how one measures and interprets a normal vote estimating incumbency in the U.S. House.
A possible problem with Gelman and King's specification is as follows. Suppose that the vote received by a candidate can be broken down into components due to partisan factors, personal factors, and incumbency status. The Gelman-King specification controls for partisan factors in estimating the impact of incumbency status, but it does not control for candidate quality. If the same candidate(s) persist(s) runs in several consecutive elections, then candidate quality effects will influence both Vj,t-l and Vj,t· In particular, the quality of any incumbent candidate will constitute an excluded variable that affects both Vj,t-l and Vj,t· There will thus be a positive correlation between Vj,t-l and Uj,t· If this claim is true, then the Gelman-King estimator is biased. Even if one's goal is to provide an overall measure of the incumbency advantage, including the scare-off and quality effects, the OLS coefficient estimate from equation 1 or 2 may reflect the higher quality of incumbents as campaigners-something that inheres in themselves rather than in the office they hold.
We cannot prove that there is a correlation between Vj,t-l and Uj,t· It is simply a suspicion on our part, based on a theoretical argument. If there is no such correlation, then the approach that we propose below will still differ in what it seeks to achieve-a decomposition of the total incumbency effect into direct and indirect components-but will not have any advantages from a purely econometric standpoint.4
4
Causation and Measurement
Conceptually, the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be decomposed into two main parts-one direct, one indirect. What we shall call the direct value of incumbency derives from the electorally valuable resources of which incumbents dispose. The indirect value of incumbency arises because everyone knows that incumbents possess electorally valuable resources and this scares off high-opportunity cost challengers -which is typ ically to say better-qualified and more formidable challengers -leaving only patsies to take on most incumbents seeking reelection.
The scare-off effect of incumbency does not operate only in the sense that incumbents are sometimes unopposed-in which case they have scared off any competition at all. It 4Gelman and King explicitly defend their specification against several other possible objections. In particular, they consider the endogeneity of candidate entry: if incumbents decide whether or not to run for reelection (thus determining the value of Ij,t) partly on the basis of their forecasts of the vote (vj,t), then the OLS estimates of ht'S coefficient will be inconsistent. It should be noted, however, that forecasting House election results at the time entry decisions must be made (i.e., before the pri maries) is an inexact science at best, so one may well wonder if many incumbents receive a strong enough signal to nudge them from the field. Gelman and King consider those incumbents implicated in scandals-presumably a pretty strong signal -and find little to worry about. They conclude that "the complications entailed in making a correction [for endogenous entry] would be more trouble than it is likely to be worth" (p. 1152). We agree. also operates in that the challengers who do come forth are weaker than might otherwise be the case.5 To see this, consider a simple rational entry model (a la Schlesinger 1966 or Rohde 1979 in which N potential candidates must decide whether to challenge an incumbent in district j. Let Wj be the opportunity cost to the j'th potential challenger of competing for the seat (i.e., the value of the job currently held by that person, less expected retention costs). The expected value of trying for the seat is pjb c, where Pj is the probability of winning, b is the value of the seat, and c is the cost of running a campaign. 6 We assume that Pj is a function, among other things, of: the direct value of incumbency at time t, denoted by 7/Jt; the national partisan swing, denoted by Dt; the "quality" of the incumbent candidate; and the "quality" of the challenger. Quality in this context refers to anything about candidates that enable them to garner votes: can they kiss babies without being awkward, speak effectively in public, look good on TV, fi gure out the appropriate issue positions to take for their constituency, develop an effective "home style" (Fenno 1978) , run an effective campaign (or hire a campaign manager who can), and so forth? Holding constant partisan factors, higher quality candidates will outperform lower quality candidates.
A potential candidate will enter the fray only if pjb -c > Wj. Thus, if 7/Jt increases, Pj decreases, and high opportunity cost (typically also high quality) candidates will not enter. In words, if the electoral value of the pot of resources that incumbents enjoy in creases, then the probability that any given challenger will defeat a particular incumbent decreases, hence the expected benefit of challenging decreases, and hence only potential candidates with low opportunity costs will make a run at the seat. In particular, local and state office-holders in good positions, who would make the most formidable competitors for the incumbent, are less likely to challenge as 7/Jt increases. 7
To measure the direct and indirect effects of incumbency separately one needs a model in which both incumbency status and candidate quality differentials are explicitly considered. We suggest a way of doing this in the next section. 50ur distinction between a direct effect of incumbency, due to the resources of office being converted to electoral use, and an indirect effect of incumbency, due to anticipation of the value of those resources scaring off strong challengers, is thus distinct from that made by King (1991b) between a "contested election incumbency advantage" and a "scare-off effect,'' where the former means the advantage of incumbents given they face some opposition and the latter means the advantage of incumbents in scaring off any competition at all. In our terms, the contested-election incumbency advantage still embodies both a direct and an indirect or scare-off effect: not scaring off all competitors but scaring off high-quality competitors 60ne might of course allow probability of victory and cost of campaigning to be functions of effort, but this (and other) refinements are unnecessary for present purposes 7 Another refinement we ignore here is the possibility that b might increase with 'l/Jt, leaving the total change in expected benefit of challenging unclear. We consider this a second-order effect 5
An Estimator of the Incumbency Advantage
In this section, we modify Gelman and King's equation 1 by adding explicit measures of the lagged and current Democratic quality advantages in each district. We first describe the operational measure of quality that we use, then present the equation to be estimated.
Although quality in the sense that we have defined it is an elusive variable, there are some attempts to measure it in the literature. The simplest measure of the quality of a candidate is whether or not he or she has held a previous elective office, hence waged a successful campaign before. This variable has been used extensively in Jacobson's work (e.g., 1980 Jacobson's work (e.g., , 1990a . It codes a candidate as either of high quality (1) or of low quality (0) .8 Using Jacobson's measure of candidate quality, the Democratic quality advantage in district j at time t can be operationalized by a variable DEA1QAj,t coded as follows: + 1 if the Democratic candidate has previously held elective office while the Republican candidate has not; 0 if neither or both candidates have previously held elective office; -1 if the Republican candidate has previously held elective office while the Democratic candidate has not. In coding this variable it should be noted that incumbents are always of quality 1 because they have previously held elective office-their current office if none else.
If we are going to add DEMQAj,t to the specification, then it also makes sense to add DEMQAj,t-l, for essentially the same reason that it makes sense to include Ij,t-i: If Vj,t-l is to proxy for the normal vote in the district, it should be controlled for both incumbency status and the Democratic quality advantage, since the normal vote is the expected vote for the Democrats given an open seat and no quality advantage for either side.
Adding DEMQAj,t and DEMQAj,t-l to equation 2, one gets the following estimable equation:
Estimating equation 3 by OLS for a single year will run afoul of the same criticism we made of Gelman and King's specification above. We can hope that including a proxy for the excluded quality variable will lessen the degree of autocorrelation in the error term, hence the degree of correlation between Vj,t-l and Ej,t, but it would be unrealistic to suppose that we have entirely got rid of the problem (if there was one to begin with). In any event, the parameters of interest are 'l/Jt and Bt: 'l/Jt will provide an estimate of the direct effect of incumbency -the value of the pot of resources -Bt while will indicate how valuable having a quality advantage is to the Democrats.
The full effect of incumbency can be derived as follows. First regress DE ]\If Q Aj,t on a vector of regressors including ht, in order to determine how much of the observed Democratic quality advantage is due to incumbency status. The coefficient on Ij,t in this regression, say 0-t, is one measure of the scare-off effect: how much the presence of an incumbent tends to deteriorate the quality of challengers. Multiplying this coefficient by Bt then converts this impact on quality into an impact on vote percentages. The overall effect of incumbency can thus be written in standard path-analytic fashion as �t + Bt O-t . 9
The particular model of DElVIQAj,t that we shall employ assumes that the Demo cratic quality advantage is sensitive to all predetermined variables that affect the Demo cratic vote, along with the lagged Democratic quality advantage. Thus, we have:
where the equation is to be run separately for each year. The constant term lo cap tures any scare-off effect due to a net swing to the Democrats. The coefficient (}t gives the impact of incumbency status, holding previous Democratic vote share, party incum bency status, previous candidate incumbency status, and previous Democratic quality advantage constant.10
Results
The basic results from estimating the two equations specified above are given in summary form in Table 2 . Our estimate of the total effect of incumbency (column 6) is very similar to Gelman and King's estimates (which are displayed in column 8). 1 1 The average difference between the two sets of estimates is a little over half a percentage point. As can be seen in Figure 1 , both estimates move in tandem over time (they correlate at 0. 99). The similarity of our estimates to those of Gelman and King suggests that, if there is a problem with the Gauss-Markov assumptions in the Gelman-King specification which 9It should be noted that this estimate of the "total" effect of incumbency is conditional on there being a contested election. Another advantage of incumbency may be that incumbents scare off any competition at all. The current measure does not capture this component of the incumbency advantage.
10We have also estimated DEMQA using an ordered probit (OP) approach. The OP and OLS results are very similar. For example, the correlation between the OLS estimate of the Democratic quality advantage in the i'th district and the OP estimate (calculated as the expected value:l · Pr(DEMQA = llXi) + 0 · Pr(DEMQA = OIXi) + -1 · Pr(DEMQA = -llXi) where Xi is the data vector for the ith district) 0.998. 11The figures given in column 8 are those we get running Gelman and King's basic model on Gary Jacobson's data. As there are a few differences between Gelman and King's dataset and Jacobson's, these figures do not correspond exactly to Gelman and King's published numbers (which appear only in the form of a graph, Figure 2 , on p. 1158). Our numbers, however, correlate at .97 with those given by Gelman and King (Figure 2) . our specification ameliorates, it is not a very large problem practically speaking -or, alternatively, our respecification does little to ameliorate it. Table 2 is sensible is that the direct and scare-off effects are positively correlated (at +0.41) . If our story is correct, they should be: a larger direct effect, after all, reflects a larger pile of resources attached to congressional seats, which should be one factor (among many) that scares off quality challengers. So it is comforting to find that there is a properly-signed (and significant) correlation.
An indication that the tripartite decomposition displayed in
The most striking features of our results are two. First, growth in the total incum bency advantage stems substantially, if not primarily, from growth in the indirect effect .
Second, growth in the indirect effect stems primarily from growth in the quality effect.
The relatively large growth rate of the indirect effect can be seen in column 7 of Table 2 , which gives the percentage of the total incumbency advantage (direct plus indirect effects) that is accounted for by the indirect effect. These numbers, graphed in Figure 2 , show an average upward trend from 1950 to 1990 of 0.41 percentage points per year (the standard error on this slope is 0.17, so it is statistically discernible from zero at conventional levels of significance) . Whereas the indirect effect constituted only 9.5% of the total incumbency effect in 1950, it constituted 28.2% in 1990.
Another way to show the importance of growth in the indirect effect is to compute the average rate of growth in both effects -indirect and direct -over various time periods, and compare them. We take four different starting points before the "big jump" in 1966 -viz., 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1964 -and calculate average growth rates over the succeeding twenty years. As can be seen in panel A of Table 3 , growth in the direct effect is never statistically discernible from zero, whereas growth in the indirect effect always is. Taking the point estimates of the rate of growth for both effects at face value, growth in the indirect effect accounts for somewhere between 42% and 116% of total growth in the incumbency advantage over the four twenty-year periods examined.
If the indirect effect was growing as fast or faster than the direct effect from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, what was driving it? The answer is apparent from Figure 3 , which plots the scare-off effect, quality effect, and their product (the indirect effect) all together. As can be seen, the scare-off effect appears to increase little, and that erratically, whereas the quality effect more than doubles from 1968 to 1976, fluctuating substantially thereafter but around a higher mean than previously observed . Visual impressions are corroborated by some simple regressions against time (see panel B of Table 3 ). Over the period from 1960 to 1980, for example, a regression of the scare-off effect on time yields a virtually nil negative coefficient, whereas a similar regression of the quality effect on time yields a positive and significant coefficient of +0.19. Virtually all of the systematic increase in the indirect effect, at least in the four twenty-year periods examined from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, is due to increases in the quality effect.
7
Quality Counts
If one wants to explain why the incumbency advantage grew from the mid-1960s onwhich is the usual puzzle posed in the literature -our figures show that one must be primarily interested in explaining why the quality advantage grew. Over the period from 1960 to 1980, a regression of the direct effect on time yields a virtually zero (actually negative) slope, as does a regression of the scare-off effect on time. The only component of the incumbency advantage that exhibits systematic growth over this time period is the quality effect. While it is true that different time periods do not yield such stark results, the basic point is not altered regardless of the time period chosen: the bulk of the systematic change appears due to increases in the quality effect.12 So how does one explain the increase in the quality effect? There are two main pos sibilities upon which we shall focus. First, there may have been a decline in partisanship within the electorate. This would have meant that the personal characteristics of candi dates mattered more. That a candidate had held office previously (was of "high quality" ) would then be a cue that he or she was not entirely unlovely, having been able to win election at least once before. It may be that the difference in quality between those who had and had not held previous office did not change over the postwar era, and that the entire effect is due to voters' putting more weight on a quality differential that had always existed. But if in fact voters were putting more weight on candidate quality, then the value of the cue should have increased too: those candidates who had previously held some office were more likely to have good personal characteristics, because it was more necessary that they have them in order to win whatever office they held (cf. Payne 1980) . A second possible explanation of the growth in the quality effect has to do with managing campaigns. Those who had held previous office had overseen at least one election campaign before. In the 1950s, a candidate might have been able to rely on the local party organization to run his or her campaign . Thus, executive abilities were not required and previous campaigning experience may have mattered little. By the 1970s, however, a candidate had to put together his or her own organization, and exec utive abilities were at a premium (see, e.g., Fowler 1993, p. 76; Stewart 1989) . The holding of previous office, by this story, signalled someone who could raise money, design or oversee the design of a campaign strategy, hire and fire as needed, and so on. As campaigning became more and more involved and expensive, high-quality candidates became stronger and stronger relative to inexperienced candidates (who could no longer rely on the local party to pull them through to a respectable showing) .
12It has been suggested to us that a linear time trend may not be what one should look for. Rather, the data may show a pre-1964 plateau, a steep increase 1964-72, and another plateau after 1972 (cf. Aldrich and Niemi N.d.) . We have run regressions allowing for breaks (in the constant term only, in the slope only, in both) in the sixties, and also plotted robust lowess regression lines (cf. Cleveland 1979), without finding any stronger evidence that the direct effect was of primary importance. Indeed, if there is a mid-sixties structural break in any of the data series, it is in the quality effect or indirect effect series-as is suggested by Figure 3 . Thus, whether one looks at linear trends only, or allows also for structural breaks in the time series, growth in the indirect effect seems to account for the bulk of the growth in the overall incumbency advantage A corollary to this story would be the pattern of increasing volatility in House elections noted by Jacobson (1987) . When incumbents faced inexperienced challengers, their vote margins were increasingly large from the mid-1960s on. When they faced experienced challengers, however, they were still in for a real fight. Thus , the average margin for incumbents increased, but so did the standard deviation of their vote swings, leaving them little more secure than before. More and more, elections turned on whether the incumbent could scare off a quality challenger. The inexperienced could no longer make a good showing, absent the help of a strong local party organization.
Finally, we should note something that does not appear to explain the growth in the quality effect: resources. Growth in the resources attached to office should push the coefficient on incumbency status (the direct effect) up, and thereby boost the scare-off effect of holding office. There is no theoretical reason, however, to suppose that it would increase the quality effect. The coefficient on the Democratic quality advantage should reflect the value of running an experienced against an inexperienced candidate, holding incumbency status (and thereby the pot of resources attached to incumbency) constant.
There may be some artifactual reasons to suspect that a growth in resources may have pushed the quality effect up. For example, consider the following four subsets of districts:
those in which DEMQAj,t = 1 and ht = 1 (Dll), those in which DEJ\!f QAj,t = 0 and ht = 1 (DOl), those in which DEf\!fQAj,t = 1 and ht = 0 (DlO), and those in which DEMQAj,t = ht = 0 (DOO). The coefficient on the Democratic quality advantage reflects a comparison between districts Dll and DOl, and between districts DOl and DOO. Suppose that the percent of districts falling in the Dll and DOl categories (both incumbent-defended) increased secularly over time and that the quality advantage was larger in incumbent-defended seats. Then the change in the composition of districts would lead to a perceived increase in the quality effect. Alternatively, perhaps the quality effect in incumbent-held but not in open seats increased. Either story would suggest that resources may have had something to do with boosting the quality effect.
As it turns out, there is no substantial increase in the proportion of incumbent-held versus open seats over the postwar period (recall that only uncontested races make it into the data set). Nor is it the case that the quality effect is larger in incumbent-held districts: indeed, in the modal year the quality effect is larger in open seats than in held seats. Thus, whatever else can be said about our results, they appear to say that the bulk of the increase in the U.S. House incumbency advantage must be chalked up to partisan dealignment of one kind or another, rather than to a growth in resources and constituency service.
How plausible are the particular stories of partisan dealignment that we have told?
Can either explain the over-time trends in the size of the quality effect-and in particular the substantial jump in the quality effect between 1970 and 1974 (or 1968 and 1976)? A full defense of the general plausibility of the dealignment hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper. There is a large literature to which Wattenberg (1984) and Jacobson (1990a) provide introductions.
A more specific defense of the plausibility of the dealignment hypotheses, in terms of the overtime trend in the quality effect, is necessarily rather speculative. We note one possibility, similar to Tufte's (1974) 1970, 1974, 1976, and 1978 A smidgen of evidence in favor of the idea that redistricting may have accelerated the personalization of campaigns, thus widening the performance differential between experienced and inexperienced candidates, is the following. If one splits the 1968 sample into two groups-those districts which were and were not redistricted in 1966-and runs the regression specified in equation (3) on both subsamples separately, one finds that the quality effect is over twice as large in the redrawn as in the unchanged districts.
Similarly, if one splits the 1970 sample into two groups-districts which were redrawn in either 1966 or 1968, and districts which were not-and runs equation (3), one finds a quality effect of essentially zero in the unchanged districts, a quality effect of 3. 73 in the redrawn districts. Perhaps there is something worth looking at here, rather subtler than the mechanism suggested in Tufte's original hypothesis.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be decomposed conceptually into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect reflects the value of the resources attached to legislative office, such as personal staff, the franking privilege, and so on. The indirect effect is the product of a scare-off effect -the ability of incumbents to scare off high-quality challengers-and a quality effect -reflecting how much electoral advantage a party accrues when it has an experienced rather than an inexperienced candidate.
Using a simple two-equation model, we estimate the size of the direct, scare-off, and quality effects for postwar U.S. House elections , finding that the bulk of the increase in the overall incumbency advantage, at least down to 1980, can be traced to increases in the quality effect. This brings us to an important conclusion: the task for those wishing to explain the growth in the vote-denominated incumbency advantage down to 1980 is to explain why the quality advantage grew -why having an experienced as opposed to an inexperienced candidate became more and more important in determining a party's vote share. 
